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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
Dylan Heatherly and William Staples frequented an inter-
net chat room where users regularly shared child pornography. 
One chat-room user repeatedly live-streamed himself raping 
and sexually abusing his six-year-old nephew. Heatherly and 
Staples encouraged him as he did so. And they repeatedly 
asked users for other child-pornography videos too. A jury 
convicted the men of receiving child pornography and conspir-
ing to do the same.  
Though they challenge their convictions and sentences on 
many grounds, we find no error and will affirm across the 
board. In doing so, we hold that the District Court properly ad-
mitted videos shown in the chat room of children suffering vi-
olent sexual abuse. After reviewing that evidence for itself, the 
court properly found that the risk of unfair prejudice did not 
substantially outweigh its probative value. The evidence was 
highly probative of the conspiracy and the defendants’ aware-





Child-pornography cases test our legal system’s commit-
ment to fairness. That is doubly true of cases involving child 
rape and sexual abuse. Though the details to follow are unset-
tling, to do justice we must describe the facts explicitly, with-
out flinching. 
A. The investigation 
Long before it became a staple of working from home, 
Zoom was regularly used for sharing child pornography. Ra-
ther than download images or videos, child pornographers and 
viewers can meet in a Zoom conference room while one user 
plays a video and shares his screen. The chat function lets them 
share messages either privately with a single user or publicly 
with everyone in the room.  
The child-pornography community has developed its own 
language and rules of conduct in these rooms. Typically, users 
require one another to turn their computers’ webcams on so 
that others can see that they are real users, not bots or police. 
Users have a shorthand to describe the kind of pornography 
they seek, like “K-9” for bestiality, “bby” for babies, or “no 
limit ped perv” for children of any age, even babies. App. 227–
28, 363–64. They use special lingo to approve and encourage 
sharing contraband, like saying, “hail [user]” after that user 
shares a video. App. 235. And their aliases themselves often 
embrace violence and pedophilia, like “Twisted Brutal 
R4pist,” “babyRaperSnuffer,” and “SEXeducation8-13.” App. 




This case stems from the undercover work of Detective 
Constable Janelle Blackadar of the Toronto Police. On the 
evening of July 22, 2015, she logged into a Zoom conference 
room that she knew was used to share child pornography. 
While in the room, she recorded the videos and images that 
were displayed and saved the public messages.  
Detective Constable Blackadar watched and preserved sev-
eral prerecorded videos showing children being sexually 
abused. One video showed an eighteen-year-old man named 
William Augusta (Zoom alias “Guy Johnson”) grabbing his 
six-year-old nephew (Victim-1), hitting him, and forcing him 
to perform oral sex. Augusta then live-streamed from his room: 
as the Zoom users watched and egged him on, he abused his 
nephew again. After the livestream, users shared more pre-
recorded videos, including one showing men raping babies.  
While Augusta was abusing his nephew live, his chat com-
ments suggested that he was in Pennsylvania. So Blackadar 
reached out to her contacts in the U.S. Government to notify 
them about what she was witnessing. Federal agents then 
phoned Zoom’s CEO to help in the investigation. Zoom gave 
agents the IP address of the user “Guy Johnson.” Police iden-
tified him as Augusta, used the Zoom images to identify his 
grandmother’s house in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, got a search 
warrant, and found his nephew there. Officers then found Au-
gusta at his job and arrested him.  
Eventually, police managed to trace the IP addresses of 
many of the users who were in the Zoom room that evening. 




dicted fifteen defendants. Twelve pleaded guilty, and a thir-
teenth died before trial. This appeal focuses on the two defend-
ants who made it to trial: Heatherly and Staples. 
B. The defendants 
1. Dylan Heatherly. Heatherly, then 31, lived alone near 
San Diego. He used the Zoom alias “Daniel Sotherland” and 
logged into the room while users were sharing prerecorded 
child pornography. On July 22 at 6:59 p.m. EDT, he posted a 
public comment in the room: “so appreciate if someone 
showed vids—need to bust [that is, ejaculate] before work.” 
App. 678. Less than a minute later, Augusta began streaming 
his live abuse of his nephew. Within three minutes, Heatherly 
posted a second public comment: “so close here.” App. 679. 
The livestream continued for roughly twenty more minutes. 
Throughout it, other users expressed their approval. Right be-
fore Heatherly’s second comment, “dirtypervy” told the other 
users that the live-rape scene “made me shoot haha.” App. 679. 
Other users publicly asked Augusta to abuse the six-year-old 
boy in particular ways: “nyc perv” told Augusta to “get him 
naked”; “babyRaperSnuffer” said, “smack him around a cou-
ple of times”; and “Andy” asked him to “rape him.” App. 679–
81. 
IP logs linked “Daniel Sotherland” to Heatherly’s address. 
When federal agents got a search warrant and searched his 
home, he spoke to them for hours, admitting that “Daniel 
Sotherland” was his alias and that he watched child 




pornography images as well as a video on his electronic 
devices.  
2. William Staples. Staples, then 56, lived alone in Ken-
tucky. Using the alias “Bill Simpson,” he logged into the Zoom 
room on July 22 about an hour after Augusta’s livestream 
ended. During his session, Staples posted several comments 
asking other users to stream videos of babies: “any hot bby 
vids?”; “anyone have hot bby vids?”; and “any other….bby?” 
App. 687, 697, 699. After user “cigarffpumpboy” shared a 
video showing the rape of an infant, Staples replied: “hail 
cigarffpumpboy.” App. 692. 
As with Heatherly, federal agents used IP logs to trace “Bill 
Simpson” to Staples. They got a search warrant, searched his 
home, and seized electronic devices that had child pornography 
on them. When agents questioned him, he admitted using the 
alias “Bill Simpson” and watching child pornography. He also 
admitted that he knew that users shared child pornography in 
the rooms. But he maintained, as he would through trial and 
sentencing, that he was there not to watch child pornography, 
but only to watch other adult men masturbate.  
Forensic analysis of Augusta’s and Staples’s devices re-
vealed that Staples had also been in the room on February 28, 
2015, another time when Augusta had live-streamed his sexual 
abuse of his nephew. On that date, after Augusta started the 
stream, Staples sent a message asking him: “u live or is that a 
vid?” App. 772. Augusta replied: “you of all people asked; u 
know i’m live.” Id. After learning that he was watching live 
abuse, Staples encouraged Augusta: “can you walk around 




3. The charges. Heatherly and Staples were each charged 
with four counts. One count charged each with receiving or 
distributing child pornography; a second charged each with 
conspiring to do the same. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (b)(1). A 
third pair of counts charged Heatherly and Staples respectively 
with knowingly publishing a notice or advertisement seeking 
to receive child pornography, and a fourth count charged each 
with conspiring to do the same. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d), (e). 
C. Trial 
At trial, the Government argued that the users in the Zoom 
room, including Heatherly and Staples, met regularly to solicit 
and share child pornography. Detective Constable Blackadar 
caught only one of those meetings. But what she saw there sug-
gested that there was an ongoing conspiracy. At trial, the Dis-
trict Court let the Government introduce several exhibits over 
one or both defendants’ objections, including: 
• Exhibits 2–8 and 10, videos of child pornography 
played in the Zoom room on July 22, as captured by De-
tective Constable Blackadar; 
• Exhibit 17, Zoom activity logs showing aliases and IP 
addresses of all users who were in the Zoom room on 
July 22; 
• Exhibit 21, internet subscriber information showing 
William Staples’s home IP address; 
• Exhibit 54, a compilation of Zoom public and private 




captured by Blackadar that evening with information re-
trieved from the defendants’ devices; 
• Exhibit 55, a spreadsheet listing Zoom public and pri-
vate chat messages between January and July 2015, 
taken from Augusta’s devices; and 
• Exhibit 61, a spreadsheet listing all Zoom users whose 
information was found on either Augusta’s, 
Heatherly’s, or Staples’s devices.  
Heatherly and Staples called no witnesses. Rather than dis-
pute facts, they tried to poke holes in the Government’s legal 
theories. In his closing argument, Heatherly’s lawyer focused 
on the conspiracy charges, arguing that the Government had 
showed only that Heatherly was a “spectator[,] . . . not a conspira-
tor.” App. 383. And he challenged whether any of Heatherly’s 
chats amounted to an ad seeking child pornography.  
Staples’s lawyer challenged the Middle District of Pennsyl-
vania as the wrong venue for prosecuting Staples for publish-
ing a notice or ad. On the merits, he noted that on July 22, Sta-
ples was not in the Zoom room until more than an hour after 
the live-streamed rape. And like Heatherly’s lawyer, he ques-
tioned the legal theories supporting the conspiracy and adver-
tising charges.  
The jury convicted both defendants of receiving or distrib-
uting child pornography and conspiring to do the same. But it 
acquitted both defendants of publishing a notice or ad seeking 




a notice or ad, the jury convicted Staples but deadlocked on 
Heatherly.  
D. After trial 
Because the crimes were so serious, the Sentencing Guide-
lines recommended imprisoning Heatherly and Staples for 
forty and seventy years. But the District Court varied down-
ward, sentencing Heatherly to twenty-five years and Staples to 
thirty.  
On appeal, Heatherly and Staples argue: 
• The District Court should have dismissed their con-
victions because there was insufficient evidence of 
conspiracy and on venue;  
• It erred by admitting explicit child pornography into 
evidence; 
• It erred in admitting various other exhibits; 
• It should have severed Staples’s trial from 
Heatherly’s; 
• It gave an improper jury instruction on venue; and 
• It miscalculated their Sentencing Guidelines ranges. 
We reject all these arguments and will affirm. 
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Both Heatherly and Staples challenge whether there was 




We must take the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution and ask whether “any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) 
(emphasis omitted). 
To prove conspiracy, the Government had to show (1) that 
two or more people agreed to commit the substantive crime (of 
receiving child pornography, and in Staples’s case, posting an 
ad seeking to receive it); (2) that the defendant joined the 
agreement knowing of its objective and intending to join with 
at least one other conspirator to achieve it; and (3) that during 
the agreement, one member did an overt act to further the 
agreement’s objectives. See United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 
194, 206 n.9 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. Na-
varro, 145 F.3d 580, 593 (3d Cir. 1998).  
A conspiracy does not require an express agreement. A 
“tacit agreement” is enough. People can tacitly agree when 
they “engage[ ]  as a group” to achieve “a common goal.” 
United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473, 478 (3d Cir. 2002). A 
group’s “many unusual acts” can be enough evidence to let a 
jury infer that the group was tacitly working together. Id. Here, 
there was ample evidence that Staples and Heatherly were part 
of a conspiracy. 
A. Staples’s connection to the conspiracy 
Staples argues that the Government presented no evidence 
of any agreement to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d). That subsec-




tisement seeking . . . to receive . . . [a] visual depiction in-
volv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con-
duct.” In fact, there was plenty of evidence that Staples and the 
other chatroom users conspired to violate § 2251(d).  
To start, while Staples was logged on, the chatroom users 
asked for child pornography countless times. On July 22, users 
asked the group for “Any more babys,” for “baby vids msg 
me,” and whether Victim-1 was “still there” to be abused. App. 
695, 697. On February 25, users asked for “Any vids,” “any 
hot vids or pics?,” “any 0 to 3,” and “any vids guys?” App. 
771–73. 
Staples argues that he never agreed with the other users to 
make those requests, but was just a bystander. There was 
plenty of evidence to rebut that argument. The chat log shows 
that the users swapped videos and egged one another on as part 
of a single, coherent group. E.g., App. 767 (“i shared last. 
who’s next?”); id. at 776 (“HAIL”). And Staples was an active 
participant in this group. He publicly celebrated when people 
posted videos. App. 692 (“hail cigarffpumpboy”). When there 
was a lull in the chatroom, he privately complained that “no 
one [was] shareing.” App. 771. And within moments of other 
people’s requests, he made nearly identical requests of his own. 
E.g., App. 687 (“any hot bby vids?”); id. at 699 (“any 
other….bby?”); id. at 771 (“did you have some hot ones to 
share?”). A jury viewing this evidence could certainly con-
clude that Staples was tacitly working with other members of 
the group to ask for and get child pornography. 
There was other circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy 




digit room ID, so a user could not stumble into the room acci-
dentally. And they protected their crimes by requiring every-
one logged in to have his webcam on. These security measures 
suggested that the users were working together; at least, they 
had to tell each other what the password was and to turn on 
their cameras. 
It does not matter that Staples never explicitly agreed with 
another user to post a notice seeking child pornography. He 
was part of a group of like-minded people who got together 
repeatedly to do just that. The shocking videos, pictures, and 
comments discussed below further support the jury’s finding 
that by frequenting this room, Staples agreed to the overarch-
ing conspiracy. 
Staples’s challenge to the evidence of venue for that con-
spiracy likewise fails. Prosecutors must prosecute a crime in a 
district where the crime was committed. U.S. Const. art. III, 
§ 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI; Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. The Government 
bears the burden of proving that venue is proper for each count, 
but only by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. 
Root, 585 F.3d 145, 155 (3d Cir. 2009). Venue is proper in any 
district where a defendant did any of the “crucial elements” of 
the crime. Id. at 156; 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). For conspiracy, 
venue lies “wherever a co-conspirator has committed an act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Perez, 280 
F.3d 318, 329 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Hyde v. United States, 225 
U.S. 347, 363–64 (1912)). 
There was enough evidence linking Staples to the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania. Staples argues that he was not logged 




matter. “Although [Staples] himself did not act in the [Middle] 
District of Pennsylvania or direct any of his actions there, [a] 
co-conspirator[ ] ,” Augusta, live-streamed the video from 
there. United States v. Renteria, 903 F.3d 326, 331 (3d Cir. 
2018). Augusta’s “overt act[ ]  in furtherance of the conspiracy 
[is] certainly sufficient to establish venue.” Id at 331–32.  
B. Heatherly’s connection to the conspiracy 
Heatherly argues that he was just a viewer, not a member 
of the conspiracy. We take that argument as a concession on 
the substantive charge of receiving child pornography. Be-
cause he never sought a judgment of acquittal on the conspir-
acy charge, we review for plain error. There was none. 
Heatherly’s claim fails for the same reasons that Staples’s 
does. Indeed, unlike Staples, Heatherly was in the room and 
commenting while Augusta live-streamed his rape of his 
nephew on July 22. We need not canvas all the other evidence 
here; we explore much of it below. 
III. ADMISSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
At trial, the Government introduced and showed the jury 
condensed versions of videos shown in the Zoom room on July 
22. These videos, Heatherly and Staples object, were inadmis-
sible under Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403. Rule 402 
requires courts to exclude irrelevant evidence; Rule 403 lets 
them exclude some relevant but unfairly prejudicial evidence. 
The jury also learned of child-pornography images and videos 
found on their devices. Heatherly and Staples claim that the 




403 and 404(b) (which requires courts to exclude some evi-
dence of bad acts). 
A word before we go on: The descriptions of the Zoom vid-
eos that follow are horrifying. Though often we can resolve 
legal issues “without subjecting the reader to the graphic and 
disturbing details of the [child] pornography,” those details are 
unavoidable when we confront a fact- and context-specific 
challenge under Rule 403. United States v. Cunningham, 694 
F.3d 372, 377 n.8 (3d Cir. 2012). “To say that the . . . descrip-
tions of the video excerpts are loathsome is an understate-
ment.” Id. at 381 n.10. Even so, we cannot shy away from scru-
tinizing them. A sanitized description would obscure whether 
the videos were unfairly prejudicial. Thus, we must confront 
the troubling details head-on. 
A. The Zoom videos 
At the start of trial, Detective Constable Blackadar de-
scribed the eight challenged videos (ages and times are  
approximate): 
• Exhibit 2 runs for two minutes and shows a man vag-
inally penetrating a four-year-old girl. The jury 
watched a five-second clip of it at normal speed.  
• Exhibit 3 is a five-and-a-half-minute-long compila-
tion of “hurtcore,” a subgenre involving the “torture 
or pain and the sexual assault of children.” App. 236. 
Many of the clips show a man vaginally or anally 
raping a three- or four-year-old girl. One clip shows 




shows a man ejaculating on the vaginal area of a 
four-to-six-year-old girl. The jury watched this 
video on fast forward for thirteen seconds.  
• Exhibit 4 runs for a minute and a half and shows a 
man anally raping a four-to-six-year-old boy. The 
Government did not show this video to the jury.  
• Exhibit 5 runs for almost eight minutes and shows 
an eight-year-old girl performing oral sex on a man. 
Near the end, the man forces his penis into her 
mouth and then ejaculates on her face. The jury 
watched part of this video on fast forward for twelve 
seconds.  
• Exhibit 6 runs for three and a half minutes, showing 
Augusta grabbing, hitting, and forcing his nephew to 
perform oral sex on him. The jury watched a ten-
second clip at normal speed.  
• Exhibit 7 is a nine-minute recording of Augusta’s 
live abuse of his nephew. Blackadar captured only 
part of the twenty-two-minute livestream. During 
that part, six-year-old Victim-1 performs oral sex on 
Augusta. Augusta then puts his nephew in his lap, 
masturbates him, penetrates the boy’s anus with his 
finger, and then puts that finger into the boy’s 
mouth. The jury watched the first two minutes of 




• Exhibit 8 is a three-and-a-half-minute-long compi-
lation of adults sexually abusing prepubescent chil-
dren. The Government did not show this video to the 
jury.  
• Exhibit 10 is a thirteen-minute-long compilation of 
adults sexually abusing babies. Parts show men forc-
ing their penises into their victims’ mouths. One part 
shows a tied-up baby being anally penetrated. The 
jury watched the first five seconds at normal speed, 
then a seven-minute clip on fast forward over the 
course of ten seconds.  
No audio was played with any of the videos.  
Heatherly and Staples make three arguments why the Dis-
trict Court should have excluded these exhibits. First, the Gov-
ernment could not prove that Heatherly watched any of the vid-
eos on July 22; indeed, he was not even logged into the room 
when most of them were shown. Staples likewise was not 
logged in on July 22 while any of the videos played. Thus, they 
argue, the videos were irrelevant.  
Second, in deciding whether the videos were admissible un-
der Rule 403, the District Court never explained on the record 
how it balanced the videos’ probative value against their po-
tential for unfair prejudice. Heatherly and Staples argue that 
this failure was a per se reversible error. And third, they claim 
the District Court abused its discretion by letting the jury see 




We review the District Court’s admission of this and all ev-
idence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Tyson, 947 F.3d 
139, 142 (3d Cir. 2020). On this record, we find no abuse of 
discretion. 
1. The videos were relevant. The Government’s theory of 
the conspiracy was that over several years, Heatherly, Staples, 
and many other coconspirators would meet online to share and 
watch child pornography. To prove an illegal conspiracy, the 
Government had to show that the users had a “tacit agreement.” 
Appellee’s Br. 26. And the more taboo the events in the Zoom 
room, the more likely that such a tacit agreement existed. That 
is especially true when one considers the alternative: that these 
men, all interested in illegal child pornography, happened to 
wander into the same private Zoom room at the same time. The 
challenged exhibits show how taboo the room was and what 
happened there, whether or not Heatherly and Staples saw 
these exact videos on that particular evening. They thus make 
it more likely that those present shared a tacit agreement. Fed. 
R. Evid. 401. So they are relevant. 
2. Failure to articulate Rule 403 balancing was not re-
versible error. District courts may exclude evidence “if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . un-
fair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. When a district court faces 
a Rule 403 objection, it must balance these two competing fac-
tors. See United States v. Finley, 726 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 
2013). It should explain its reasoning on the record; when it 
does so, “we will rarely disturb its ruling.” Id. (quoting United 
States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 889 (3d Cir. 1992)). But we 




clear that it balanced the Rule 403 factors. We have affirmed a 
district court’s overruling of a Rule 403 objection even when 
it just said that the probative value outweighed the risk of un-
fair prejudice. Id.  
We prefer that the district court show its work. That is the 
wiser and sounder course. But we will affirm so long as it 
makes clear that it did the weighing itself. Compare, e.g., id. 
(affirming because it was clear that the district court did the 
balancing), with Sampson, 980 F.3d at 889 (reversing because 
it was not clear that the court did the analysis at all), and Gov’t 
of the V.I. v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 918 (3d Cir. 1992) (same). 
Here, the District Court said just enough to confirm that it 
did the Rule 403 balancing. Before trial, the lawyers argued 
back and forth about Rule 403. At trial, when the Government 
first tried to introduce the videos, both Heatherly and Staples 
objected that the videos would be “highly prejudicial.” App. 
244. The District Court acknowledged the Rule 403 objection 
and heard further argument from defense counsel and the Gov-
ernment. It then held that the Government had shown that the 
videos would not unduly prejudice Heatherly, but deferred its 
ruling pending further foundation as to Staples: “[B]efore we 
even get to the [Rule] 403 analysis, I want to know when it is 
you’re planning to show [the videos’] connection” to Staples. 
App. 244. Near the end of trial, after laying that foundation, the 
Government again moved to admit Exhibits 2–8 and 10. The 
court noted the previous objection, said it was preserved, and 
admitted the videos. True, it did not articulate its Rule 403 




refer back to the Rule 403 analysis that it had promised to do 
once the Government laid more of a foundation. 
In context, we see that the court did the analysis and con-
cluded that Rule 403 did not bar the evidence. As we said in 
Finley, the more a district court says, the better. See 726 F.3d 
at 491. But as we also said in Finley, a district court need say 
only enough to show that it weighed the Rule 403 factors. It 
said just enough here. 
3. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by admit-
ting the exhibits. District courts deserve broad deference in ap-
plying Rule 403. The rule is written in discretionary terms: 
“The court may exclude . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 403 (emphasis 
added). And the caselaw “stress[es] the extraordinary breadth 
of discretion that this Rule invites.” Christopher B. Mueller & 
Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 1 Federal Evidence § 4:12 (4th ed. 2020). 
So we normally reject bright-line rules about what evidence 
must be excluded under Rule 403. See Cunningham, 694 F.3d 
at 391 (declining to adopt a bright-line rule excluding poten-
tially inflammatory child pornography). Rather, we must judge 
each case on its own facts and record. 
Another point bears note. Rule 403 bars not all prejudice, 
but only unfair prejudice. United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 
261, 279 (3d Cir. 2012). It does not protect defendants from 
devastating evidence in general. The exhibits were disturbing 
because the alleged crimes themselves were extraordinarily 
disturbing. Rule 403 is not a shield to keep juries from learning 
details of horrific crimes. United States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 




These videos were highly probative. Proving a conspiracy 
required showing more than that someone played child pornog-
raphy on July 22. The Government had to prove that the room 
was a haven for child pornography, a place where pedophiles 
would keep gathering to share in their vile pastime. Yet be-
cause the undercover agent was there only one time, the Gov-
ernment could not prove directly that anyone played child por-
nography at other times. For those other times, all the Govern-
ment had were Zoom usernames and comment logs. So it 
needed to give the jury a snapshot so that the jury could match 
the commentary to the visual events. That snapshot was the 
evening of July 22. Having heard descriptions and seen clips 
of the child pornography streamed that evening, the jury could 
better grasp the scope of the alleged conspiracy and the tacit 
agreement driving it. To do that, it had to see those videos 
firsthand. 
And jurors had to see the videos themselves, not just hear 
descriptions or stipulations, to appreciate that anyone who fre-
quented that room must have approved of the images shared 
there. Both defendants claimed at some point that they were 
not really interested in child pornography but visited the room 
because they wanted to watch other men masturbate. If the jury 
had believed those defenses, it might have doubted whether the 
defendants really agreed to request child pornography. But the 
horrific videos demolished those defenses. They proved that 
Heatherly and Staples would not have frequented the room un-
less they wanted to watch images of children being sexually 
abused. No one would have gone back to the room innocently, 
thinking that the images the first time around were borderline 




The probative value here was thus greater than in run-of-
the-mill cases of simple possession of child pornography. In 
those cases, defendants often concede that anyone who 
watched the videos would know that they were child pornog-
raphy. Instead, the only factual dispute is whether the defend-
ant knew the files were on the computer. See, e.g., United 
States v. Welshans, 892 F.3d 566, 571 (3d Cir. 2018); Cunning-
ham, 694 F.3d at 379–80. The videos here did much more than 
that. 
True, some of our recent Rule 403 analyses of child por-
nography have come out differently. In Cunningham and 
Welshans, we held that the district courts erred in admitting the 
evidence. 694 F.3d at 383; 892 F.3d at 576. But Rule 403 anal-
ysis is always fact- and context-specific. And each case is dis-
tinguishable in several important ways. 
Start with Cunningham. That case involved no conspiracy 
charges. The district court had let the jury watch excerpts of 
two graphic child-pornography videos. 694 F.3d at 379–82. 
The court overruled a Rule 403 objection, relying only on the 
Government’s descriptions of the videos and without watching 
the videos itself before it ruled. Id. at 379. We held that it had 
abused its discretion, agreeing with several other circuits that a 
trial court must see the challenged exhibits for itself. See id. at 
383–87. And because the court had not watched the videos, we 
did not afford it the usual Rule 403 deference. See id. at 388. 
That procedural error was intertwined with the substantive er-
ror and crucial to Cunningham’s outcome. Id. at 392; see also 




On our independent review, we held that the court should 
have excluded the challenged videos. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 
at 388. The exhibits were probative, as they were the actual 
child pornography that the defendant had possessed, and their 
lurid content tended to show that he knew what they depicted. 
See id. at 389. But because neither issue was disputed at trial, 
that probative value was minimal. See id. at 377–80. So their 
admission already tested the limits of the Old Chief maxim that 
the Government may put on evidence to prove its case and need 
not accept an offer to stipulate. See Old Chief v. United States, 
519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997). And given the limited purpose of 
introducing the videos, we saw no reason why the Government 
needed to show so many clips or why the excerpts needed to 
be so shocking and violent. See Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 389–
90. 
Here, by contrast, the District Court did review the chal-
lenged evidence before admitting it. So we give its ruling sub-
stantial deference. Plus, the nature, content, and volume of vid-
eos prove Heatherly’s and Staples’s involvement in a broader 
conspiracy in the Zoom room. That was not an issue in Cun-
ningham. And the risk of unfair prejudice was much lower here 
than in Cunningham. The jury had to understand the videos’ 
graphic details to decide whether there was a conspiracy, so at 
some point it had to hear brutal descriptions of abuse. That was 
already going to inflame the jury’s emotions. The marginal 
prejudice from seeing short, and in many cases fast-forwarded, 
video clips, after hearing detailed descriptions, was thus lower. 
Welshans, which relied heavily on Cunningham, is likewise 




involved child-pornography videos played for the jury. But the 
crux of the appeal was repeated, detailed descriptions of other 
child pornography that the defendant allegedly possessed. See 
id. at 571–73, 575. Though we reiterated that there are no per 
se rules on this issue, we held that admitting the descriptions 
violated Rule 403. Id. at 575–76 (citing Cunningham, 694 F.3d 
at 391). 
A key to the outcome in Welshans, as in Cunningham, was 
that “the Government had extensive evidence that did not in-
volve violent or sadistic content, and Welshans stipulated that 
the files recovered were child pornography.” Welshans, 892 
F.3d at 576. The descriptions were relevant only to show that 
the contraband was child pornography, an issue no one dis-
puted. Here, however, the videos were highly relevant to prove 
the conspiracy, which was hotly disputed. And here, the Gov-
ernment did not choose the most disturbing descriptions and 
videos from a mountain of evidence. On the contrary, the only 
images the Government had from the Zoom room were the 
handful of videos that Detective Constable Blackadar recorded 
on July 22. 
4. Any error was harmless. Even if admitting the videos 
was an error, substantively or procedurally, there was no prej-
udice. Heatherly worries that “[a]nger is a wind that can extin-
guish the flame of reason.” Heatherly Br. 2. But here, the winds 
of anger did not blow out that candle or dim its flame. As 
Heatherly admits, the jurors “were able, to some extent, to di-
vorce their natural emotion from reason.” Id. at 3. The jury ev-
idently considered the evidence separately on each count and 




54 (3d Cir. 2014). It convicted on some counts, acquitted on 
others, and on one count reached different conclusions about 
each defendant. This is not the mark of a jury blinded by rage. 
See id. (explaining that in context, the split jury verdict 
“strongly suggest[ed] that the jury was . . . not swayed by the 
prejudicial character of the” child pornography); United States 
v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 899 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing with ap-
proval Judge Friendly’s treatment of the jury’s “discriminating 
acquittal on one of the counts” as “evidence that the jury was 
able to overcome any prejudic[ial taint]” in United States v. 
Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 65 (2d Cir. 1983)). And lots of other evi-
dence, including the defendants’ graphic messages and the de-
tective’s descriptions of the videos, supported the convictions 
too. See United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 540 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
In closing, we again urge trial courts to articulate their Rule 
403 analyses on the record. That is especially important for in-
flammatory evidence. If they do so, we will rarely disturb their 
rulings. Still, we can affirm as long as the trial court clearly did 
the Rule 403 analysis. Here, the District Court did.  
B. Child pornography from the defendants’  
computers 
Heatherly and Staples each challenge the admission of 
child pornography found on their electronic devices. We reject 
those challenges. 
1. Images from Heatherly’s devices. The District Court ad-
mitted Exhibits 33A–F, child pornography found on his de-




acts as character evidence, in violation of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b)(1). He asserts that the evidence had little rele-
vance to him because (unlike Staples) he never claimed at trial 
that he was in the room to watch other men. He also says that 
there was “scant” evidence that he viewed or even knew about 
these images. Heatherly Br. 30. And he argues that the court 
erred by not weighing the Rule 403 factors on the record.  
Heatherly’s Rule 404(b) argument is misguided. Though 
Rule 404(b) does exclude evidence of prior bad acts like un-
charged crimes, Rule 414 carves out an exception for child mo-
lestation prosecutions (including child pornography). All the 
crimes charged here fall within that exception. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 414(d)(2)(B), (F). 
The evidence was relevant to show his interest in child por-
nography. That supported the Government’s theory that he 
(and Staples) sought to receive child pornography by posting 
comments in Zoom rooms, an element of the notice-or-adver-
tisement count. It also rebutted Heatherly’s pretrial statement 
that he went to the room to watch adult men masturbate, not to 
watch child pornography. So while the evidence was more pro-
bative for Staples because he denied any sexual interest in chil-
dren, it was probative for Heatherly too. 
As for whether Heatherly ever watched or even knew about 
the images on his devices, that goes to the weight of the evi-
dence, not its admissibility. He was free to deny his awareness 
of them but chose not to. 
Finally, the District Court did a Rule 403 analysis. Before 




analyze at trial “the relative weights of [their] probative value 
and prejudicial effect under Rule 403.” D.C. Dkt. No. 836, at 
5. True, when it later admitted the evidence, it did not explain 
its logic or mention the Rule 403 factors. But nothing suggests 
that it forgot its promise to balance them. For the reasons given 
earlier, we see just enough confirmation that the District Court 
balanced those factors. In any event, as explained, any error 
was harmless. 
2. Images from Staples’s devices. Staples makes similar ar-
guments against admitting the images that were found on his 
computer (Exhibits 62A–I). The District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting them. 
For Staples, the Rule 403 analysis is even simpler: the evi-
dence rebutted his defense. Staples claimed he was a gay man 
who went to Zoom rooms just to watch men masturbate and 
had no interest in child pornography. He opened the door to 
this evidence and cannot complain that the Government 
walked through it.  
Staples also argues that the court should have excluded the 
images because he offered to stipulate that they were child por-
nography. But an offer of stipulation does not make evidence 
inadmissible. “As the Supreme Court remarked in Old Chief, 
‘[a] syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a court-
room may be no match for the robust evidence that would be 
used to prove it.’ The government is thus entitled to put forth 
the relevant evidence that it chooses.” Finley, 726 F.3d at 492 




519 U.S. at 189). And Staples does not explain how this evi-
dence unfairly prejudiced him. Indeed, at this trial, the jury saw 
far worse. 
IV. OTHER EVIDENTIARY RULINGS 
Besides the videos and child pornography, the Government 
also introduced other evidence of the Zoom activity of 
Heatherly, Staples, and their coconspirators. The District Court 
properly admitted this evidence. 
A. Zoom chat messages and user-avatar data 
Heatherly and Staples object to three forensic compilations 
of Zoom data: Exhibits 54, 55, and 61. But they have forfeited 
these objections. Heatherly’s opening brief spends just one 
page discussing them and does not cite a single legal authority 
for why it was error to admit them. Staples has even less to say, 
simply joining Heatherly’s arguments. By not developing these 
arguments properly, Heatherly and Staples have forfeited 
them. See Sikirica v. Wettach (In re Wettach), 811 F.3d 99, 115 
(3d Cir. 2016).  
B. Zoom user-activity logs 
The Government introduced a list of user logs subpoenaed 
from Zoom as Exhibit 17. The list showed which users were in 
the room during the relevant times on July 22, 2015. The logs 
are hearsay. But they are classic business records (a hearsay 
exception): they were made contemporaneously based on in-
formation from someone with knowledge; they were kept in 
the course of Zoom’s regular business activity; and keeping 




803(6)(A)–(C). Plus, the Government introduced Exhibit 17A, 
a certification by the custodian of records that the records meet 
those requirements. Id. R. 803(6)(D), 902(11). So there is no 
merit to Heatherly and Staples’s objection that the agent on the 
stand had no personal knowledge of Zoom’s recordkeeping 
practices.  
Heatherly also misreads Exhibit 17A as saying that Exhibit 
17 was merely based on business records and is not itself a 
business record. That is not what it says. The custodian certi-
fied not that the records (Exhibit 17) are based on a review of 
business records, but rather that the certification itself (Exhibit 
17A) is based on a review of Zoom records. He added that Ex-
hibit 17 reflects “business records which are created contem-
poraneously with the activity,” “are kept in the ordinary course 
of Zoom’s business and pertain to the regular business of 
Zoom.” Exhibit 17A (App. 658). That satisfies Rule 803(6) and 
902(11). 
C. IP information 
Staples, but not Heatherly, challenges the admission of Ex-
hibits 21, 21A, 41, and 41A. In Exhibit 21, Staples’s internet 
provider ViaSat links Staples with the Zoom alias “Bill Simp-
son.” Exhibit 21A certifies that Exhibit 21 is a business record. 
Exhibit 41 is a log of IP addresses and usernames from a Zoom 
room in December 2015; Exhibit 41A is Zoom’s certification 
of it as a business record.  
Staples argues that Exhibit 21 is signed not by a ViaSat em-




companies’ business records. But nothing in Rule 902(11) re-
quires that the records custodian be an employee of the same 
company. Nor, contrary to Staples, do the rules require the cus-
todian to explain in detail who compiled the records, how, or 
how she knows they are accurate.  
As for Exhibits 41 and 41A, Staples contests not their sub-
stance, but only that the Government updated its certification 
too close to trial. But he did not object at trial, so we review 
only for plain error. And though he asserts that the update prej-
udiced him, he never explains how it did or what he would have 
done differently if he had gotten it earlier. He has not shown 
that any error affected his substantial rights. See United States 
v. Greenspan, 923 F.3d 138, 147 (3d Cir. 2019). 
V. SEVERANCE 
Before trial, Staples moved to sever his trial from 
Heatherly’s. The District Court reasonably denied that motion. 
We review the District Court’s denial of a severance for 
abuse of discretion. United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 
568 (3d Cir. 1991). We presume that courts will try 
codefendants jointly, especially when both are charged in a 
single conspiracy. See id. To overcome that presumption, “[a]n 
appellant’s burden is heavy: he must demonstrate ‘clear and 
substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial.’ ” Id. 
(quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 400 (3d 
Cir. 1981)) (emphases omitted). It is not enough to show that a 
severance would have increased the chance of acquittal, or that 
some evidence applied to some defendants more than others or 




Staples’s severance argument centers on Exhibit 7, which 
showed Augusta’s live-streamed abuse of his nephew on July 
22, 2015. He stresses that this video, “the centerpiece of the 
trial,” related only to Heatherly, since Staples was not in the 
room when Augusta streamed it. Staples Br. 21. That objection 
fails. The Government introduced the video not to show what 
each defendant was doing that night, but to prove the pe-
dophilic culture that the conspirators shared. 
Staples likewise objects to several images and chats seized 
from Heatherly’s computer. But the court gave a proper limit-
ing instruction, telling the jury to consider the evidence against 
each defendant and on each count separately. And the jury 
would have had no difficulty keeping the evidence from each 
defendant’s computer separate. In short, the court did not abuse 
its discretion by denying the requested severance and trying the 
two coconspirators together. 
VI. THE VENUE INSTRUCTION 
Neither Heatherly nor Staples is from the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania or was there during the conspiracy. Rather, 
they were convicted based solely on Augusta’s live broadcasts 
of abuse from there. At trial, Staples argued that venue was 
thus improper in the Middle District. 
The District Court instructed the jury that for venue to be 
proper, “the government must convince you that some act in 
furtherance of the crimes charged” happened in the district. 
App. 396. Staples asked the court to insert the words “on a par-




quest. App. 1160–61. On appeal, he renews his request and ob-
serves that the Third Circuit’s model jury instruction uses the 
singular “offense” and “crime” rather than the plural. Third 
Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 3.09 
(2018). Using the singular, he argues, would have clarified that 
the jury must find venue separately on each count.  
We agree that the use of the plural could have misled a jury 
into thinking that venue was proper on all charges so long as a 
crucial element of one charge happened there. Using the sin-
gular would have prevented any possible confusion. Still, the 
instruction made no difference. See United States v. Guada-
lupe, 402 F.3d 409, 415 (3d Cir. 2005) (requiring proof that an 
erroneous jury instruction so influenced the jury’s delibera-
tions that it “produce[d] a miscarriage of justice”). In his clos-
ing argument, Staples’s counsel contested venue only on the 
count of knowingly publishing an ad seeking child pornogra-
phy. No one mentioned venue on any of the other charges. And 
the jury acquitted Staples on that one count, even though it con-
victed him on all the others. Evidently, the use of the plural did 
not produce a miscarriage of justice. So this argument fails. 
VII. SENTENCING 
The District Court sentenced Heatherly to twenty-five 
years’ imprisonment and Staples to thirty. Both now challenge 
their sentences. Each asserts that the court should not have ap-
plied the guideline for involvement in producing child pornog-
raphy. Heatherly also argues that his sentence was far more se-
vere than that of a codefendant, whom he claims was compa-




mistakenly considered conduct of which he had been acquitted. 
These arguments fail as well. 
A. The district court applied the right guideline 
The applicable guideline for receiving, possessing, adver-
tising or soliciting child pornography is U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2. Or-
dinarily, that guideline sets a base offense level of 22. 
§ 2G2.2(a)(2). But a cross-reference provides that if the crime 
“involved causing, . . . or seeking by notice or advertisement, a 
minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct . . . for the purpose 
of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct,” the 
guideline for producing child pornography applies. § 2G2.2(c). 
That guideline sets a much higher base offense level of 32, add-
ing decades to a defendant’s recommended sentence. 
§ 2G2.1(a).  
The more serious guideline applied here. Heatherly and 
Staples’s sentences properly depended not only on their own 
conduct, but also on that of their coconspirators. Under the rel-
evant-conduct guideline, the court had to consider the acts of 
coconspirators that were “within the scope of the jointly under-
taken criminal activity,” “in furtherance of” it, and “reasonably 
foreseeable.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Coconspirator Au-
gusta produced a “live visual depiction” of child pornography 
at least twice, on February 28 (when Staples was in the room) 
and July 22 (when Heatherly was). § 2G2.2(c)(1). So the only 
question is whether Heatherly and Staples agreed with Augusta 
to have him live-stream child pornography. The District Court 




Heatherly argues that he sought images only of past abuse. 
By asking for “someone [to] show[ ]  vids,” he argues, he was 
not seeking live abuse, because “vid[eo]s” supposedly implies 
recordings. App. 678. Not so. Videos can be live. A video is 
just a set of “images for display on a television screen or other 
electronic device.” Video (def. 1a), Oxford English Dictionary 
(3d ed. 2016). Indeed, we held argument in this very case by 
video: that is, a live videoconference. And when Augusta 
started to stream a video, Heatherly encouraged him to con-
tinue because he was “so close here.” App. 864. 
The evidence for Staples was even clearer. Staples specifi-
cally asked Augusta whether he was live. When Augusta said 
he was, Staples egged him on to “walk around with [his] cock 
out.” App. 773.  
Staples objects that the District Court made no factual find-
ings specifying how much he agreed with, was involved in, and 
could have reasonably foreseen the conspiracy’s crimes. But at 
sentencing, the District Court specifically rejected Staples’s 
portrayal of his own conduct, finding that he “encouraged [Au-
gusta’s] behavior and was an active participant in it.” App. 479. 
It adopted the position advanced by the Government and ac-
cepted by the presentence report that Staples knew the object 
of the conspiracy and encouraged Augusta’s live abuse. The 
factual findings in the report suffice to support the court’s reli-
ance on the conspiracy. See United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 




B. The sentencing court properly sentenced Heatherly 
more harshly than a less-culpable coconspirator 
Finally, Heatherly raises a sentencing disparity. He objects 
that his sentence was almost four times as long as that of his 
coconspirator Ed Westbury, who pleaded guilty to conspiring 
to distribute child pornography and received only six-and-a-
half years. But the District Court saw that discrepancy and 
grappled with it thoughtfully. It compared Heatherly’s conduct 
to that of twelve other defendants who had already been or 
would be sentenced. Most had pleaded guilty and been sen-
tenced to decades in prison. And it evidently saw Westbury as 
an “outlier” not only because he had pleaded guilty, but also 
because he had sought “teen vids” rather than those of prepu-
bescent children. App. 453, 455, 459.  
The sentencing court treated Heatherly in line with most of 
the other defendants. At the same time, it saw that he was nei-
ther “the least [culpable] among them” nor “the most culpa-
ble.” App. 460. He was less culpable than several other defend-
ants who had been sentenced to 30 to 40 years. In particular, 
the court noted that another man had “telephoned the little 
boy[,] terrorizing him.” App. 456. That man had been sen-
tenced to 30 years, so the court reasoned that Heatherly’s sen-
tence should be somewhat less.  
The sentencing court put enormous care and thought into 
distinguishing the defendants based on their conduct. As it ex-
plained: “It’s very difficult to draw these distinctions, but we 
have to do it. And, in fact, based on what we know about 
[Heatherly’s] conduct, he is less culpable than some others 




App. 460. The court did treat him as such, varying downwards 
from the forty-year sentence recommended by the Guidelines 
to twenty-five years. The punishment, it judged, fit the severe 
crimes. We respect that considered judgment. 
In trying to prove a sentencing disparity, Heatherly com-
plains that the District Court must have considered conduct of 
which he was acquitted. But he cites nothing in the record sug-
gesting that. In any event, the Supreme Court has held that sen-
tencing courts may consider acquitted conduct at sentencing. 
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149, 155–57 (1997) (per 
curiam) (explaining that an acquittal shows only reasonable 
doubt, which is consistent with the preponderance-of-the-evi-
dence threshold at sentencing). The sentence was proper. 
* * * * * 
The child-pornography videos were essential to prove the 
tacit conspiracy, the culture of the Zoom room, and Heatherly 
and Staples’s awareness of what they were seeking and encour-
aging. The District Court properly admitted those videos and 
other evidence, denied a severance, found the evidence suffi-
cient, and sentenced Heatherly and Staples based on their roles 
in instigating sexual abuse. Though the venue instruction was 
not ideal, in context the jury grasped it and was careful enough 





McKee J., concurring. 
The importance of subjecting inflammatory evidence to 
the Fed. R. Evid. 403 balancing test cannot be overemphasized.  
This is particularly true when the evidence in question is as 
potentially inflammatory as it was here.  My colleagues do not 
overstate the nature of these video clips in citing to our 
statement in United States v. Cunningham.1  As the Majority 
explains, we there stated: “[T]o say that the . . . descriptions of 
the video excerpts are loathsome is an understatement.”2  
Accordingly, my colleagues quite correctly, and without 
exaggeration, warn that the descriptions which they present are 
“horrifying.”3  Regrettably, those descriptions are nonetheless 
necessary for the reasons my colleagues so carefully explain.  
This tension between the potential for unfair prejudice on the 
one hand, and substantial probative value on the other, results 
in a Rule 403 balance that is as difficult as it is delicate in these 
kinds of cases.   
 
Although the District Court was aware this balance 
must be struck under Rule 403 before admitting such evidence, 
I am not convinced that the court actually undertook the 
precarious task of weighing the probative value of this 
evidence against its obvious potential to generate animus and 
undue prejudice.  The court did note the 403 objection and was 
therefore clearly aware of that issue as my colleagues explain.  
However, being aware of the Rule 403 issue does not 
necessarily establish that the required balancing was actually 
undertaken by the District Court.  I nevertheless concur in the 
Majority Opinion for two reasons.  First, the fact that the jury 
did not convict defendants of all charges means that jurors’ 
emotions where not overwhelmed, and they were nevertheless 
able to thoughtfully evaluate the evidence that was introduced. 
Thus, any error in admitting the videos was harmless.  Second, 
we have held that when the trial court fails to conduct this 
analysis, we may do so on review.4  As I shall explain, given 
the charges here, I believe the probative value of the evidence 
 
1 694 F.3d 372, 377 n.8 (3d Cir. 2012). 
2 Maj. Op. 15-16. 
3 Id. at 16. 




did outweigh its prejudicial potential.  Thus, the trial court did 
not err in allowing it.  
 
I. Harmless Error 
 
The District Court did state “before we even get to the 
403 analysis, I want to know when it is, you’re planning to 
show [the connection to Staples].”  However, the court later 
admitted the exhibits without conducting any further analysis 
on the record.5  The government argues that the District Court 
conducted the analysis because the court “stated that it had 
reviewed the exhibits and recognized the need for it to conduct 
a Rule 403” analysis at some unspecified time in the future.6  
Although the District Court thus clearly “recognized it needed 
to perform” the analysis, there is no indication it later did so.7  
 
Nevertheless, I conclude any error would have been 
harmless even though I reject the government’s suggestion that 
the impact of the videos was mitigated by partially fast-
forwarding through them.8  It by no means follows that fast-
forwarding through disgusting video images makes them any 
less disgusting or shocking.  There is absolutely nothing in the 
record to support such conjecture, and the government has not 
offered anything to us to support it.  Indeed, one could just as 
forcibly argue that fast-forwarding these images would make 
them even more repulsive.  Moreover, the twenty seconds of 
regular speed footage included approximately ten seconds of 
“hurtcore” porn involving a five or six-year-old boy being hit 
and grabbed by the neck.9  
 
Heatherly argues with some force that the kind of anger 
that will necessarily be cultivated in the minds of jurors 
viewing the kind of unspeakable cruelty and depravity in these 
 
5 Appx 244; see also Appx 365 (admitting exhibits without 
mentioning 403, probative value, prejudice, etc.); Heatherly 
Br. at 19-20 (the only comment regarding 403, noted above, 
was on day two and the exhibits were admitted without 
further discussion on day five.). 
6 USA Br. at 28. 
7 USA Br. at 29. 
8 USA Br. at 30-31. 
9 Heatherly Br. at 23-24. 
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video clips is of such force that it is akin to “a wind that can 
extinguish the flame of reason.”10  However, as my colleagues 
explain, this jury did not convict either defendant on all counts 
in the indictment.11  Thus, the flame of reason continued to 
flicker, though it may well have been stressed.  The Majority 
Opinion succinctly focuses on the significance of that fact and 
its relevance to our Rule 403 inquiry.12   
 
The jury’s ability to reason and individualize the 
evidence was not overwhelmed by the emotion, anger, or 
animosity that the video clips almost certainly engendered 
against these defendants.  The jury refused to convict the 
defendants of publishing a notice or advertisement to receive 
child pornography.13  Absent that consideration, the risk that 
the jurors’ reason was overwhelmed would have been too great 
to sustain the decision to admit this evidence.  Nevertheless, 
given the verdicts here, and assuming we can perform the Rule 
403 balance on appeal, I conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence over the 403 
objections.14 
 
10 Id. (citing to Heatherly Br. at 2). 
11 Heatherly and Staples were charged with the following 
criminal Counts: (11) Conspiracy to Receive or Distribute 
Child Pornography” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) 
and § 2252(b)(1); (12) Receipt or Distribution of Child 
Pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), § 
2252(b)(1), and § 2; (13) Conspiracy to Publish a Notice or 
Advertisement of Child Pornography 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d); 
(16) and (17) Publishing a Notice or Advertisement to 
Receive Child Pornography 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d). Appx 5-12. 
Dylan Heatherly was found guilty of Counts 11 and 12 and 
not guilty of Counts 13 and 17. Appx 13. Staples was found 
guilty of Counts 11, 12, 13 and not Count 16. Appx 20-21. 
12 Maj. Op. at 25. 
13 Appx 8; 12.  
14 I use conditional language because it is not clear to me that 
our practice of conducting an independent review under Rule 
403 when the District Court fails to do so is consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent. Eufrasio was decided in 1991. 
Thereafter, in 2008, the Supreme Court decided Sprint/United 
Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384. There, in 
referring to the propriety of affording a District Court’s 
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II. The Evidence Was Admissible Under Rule 403 
 
While district courts should conduct the Rule 403 
balancing test on the record, this is one of the narrow situations 
where we have held that we may be permitted to conduct the 
Rule 403 weighing analysis ourselves.15  In undertaking that 
balance, I conclude that, when the risk of unfair prejudice is 
balanced against the probative value of these videos under Rule 
403, the balance tips toward allowing the jurors to see these 
video clips.16   
 
The charges against these defendants included 
conspiring to receive or distribute child pornography.  Thus, 
the government had to prove the people in the Zoom chat had 
entered into such an agreement.  Merely establishing that 
several individuals independently watched the same livestream 
 
evidentiary rulings deference, the Supreme Court said: “This 
is particularly true with respect to Rule 403 since it requires 
an on-the-spot balancing of probative value and prejudice, 
potentially to exclude as unduly prejudicial some evidence 
that already has been found to be factually relevant.’’ 
(internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added). We cited 
that language in Finley. See 726 F.3d at 491. However, there, 
the issue of our conducting the 403 balance did not arise 
because we concluded that the District Court did conduct the 
required balancing and we agreed that the evidence was 
properly admitted. Nevertheless, given my colleagues’ 
conclusion that the District Court did satisfy (though barely) 
the balancing requirement, and since I would find any failure 
to do so harmless error, it is neither necessary nor appropriate 
to attempt to resolve any tension between our jurisprudence 
and Supreme Court precedent here. I mention it only because 
it is relevant to  the structure of my discussion. 
15 Eufrasio 935 F.2d at 572. I emphasize my colleagues’ 
admonition that: “[w]e prefer that the district court show its 
work. That is the wiser and sounder course.” Maj. Op. at 19. 
Indeed, it is.  For reasons that should be apparent to everyone, 
the atmosphere in a courtroom must be factored into the Rule 
403 balance. There is obviously no way for an appellate court 
to have a feeling for the level of tension or emotion during a 
trial. 
16 Maj. Op. at 25. 
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would not necessarily imply an agreement to receive or 
distribute child pornography.  Such an agreement is, of course, 
at the heart of a conspiracy charge.  “[T]he essence of a 
conspiracy is a unity of purpose or common design.”17  The 
video clips are highly relevant to proving the existence of such 
unity of purpose and consequently, to showing implicit 
agreement to receive and/or distribute child pornography.  The 
video clips establish the culture of the Zoom chat and thus 
support an inference that there was an implicit agreement and 
unity of purpose amongst the people who watched the 
livestream that it would be distributed to them and received by 
them.  Indeed, the evidence here is so horrendous that it 
arguably undermines any suggestion to the contrary.  
 
Staples claimed he only sought to engage with adult 
men in the chatroom.18  The videos belie that assertion.  They 
were critical to establishing that both defendants encouraged 
the distribution and receipt of the livestreams.  Although 
Staples did not specifically ask for more, Heatherly specifically 
did ask for “vids” so he could “bust before work.”19  Given the 
nature of what they were watching, the defendants’ continued 
participation in the Zoom chat after seeing what was occurring 
there is as much a request for more of the same content as a 
verbal request would have been.  
 
17 United States v. Kates, 508 F.2d 308, 310-11 (3d Cir.1975) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“It is well established that 
the gist of a conspiracy is an agreement. However slight or 
circumstantial the evidence may be, it must, in order to be 
sufficient to warrant affirmance, tend to prove that the 
appellant entered into some form of agreement, formal or 
informal, with his alleged co-conspirators. Similarly, we have 
stated that the essence of a conspiracy is a unity of purpose or 
common design.”). 
18 Staples Br. at 12. (“Mr. Staples admitted that he visited the 
Zoom chat room under the alias “Bill Simpson” but 
contended that his purpose was interacting with adult men, 
not viewing child pornography. (Appx 286 (Transcr. p. 403-
405))”). 
19 Heatherly Br. at 8; Appx 1069 (Heatherly stating “so 
appreciate if someone showed vids-need to bust before 
work;” and, approximately three-minutes later, “so close”).  
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In United States v. Bailey, we explained that the 
probative value of such evidence partially depends on the 
availability of an alternative, less prejudicial means of 
establishing the same facts.20 Here, even though a detective 
testified and described the contents of all of the videos in great 
detail, it is fair to assume that there is no way that the 
experience of any of the jurors would have enabled them to 
fully grasp the horrors of the livestream the defendants were 
watching or the significance of them remaining in the chat.  
The adage: “seeing is believing” encapsulates the need for 
these jurors to actually see the recordings from that Zoom chat.  
The culture of that chat room simply defies the ability of the 
most skilled witness to articulate the horror of what the 
defendants were watching. This culture is highly relevant to 
determining if there was an agreement amongst those who 
knowingly participated in the Zoom chats.  It is the very fact 
that the videos cause such revulsion that suggests that one 
could not willingly view them without tacitly agreeing to the 
receipt of the livestream.21  
 
This does not, of course, mean that there is a different 
threshold under Rule 403 for all child pornography cases or an 
implied exception to the required Rule 403 balance in cases 
involving child pornography or acts of extreme depravity.  Nor 
does it mean that anyone who knowingly views such conduct 
necessarily conspires in its production, distribution or receipt.  
Rather, Rule 403 requires a very delicate, and exceedingly 
difficult balance based upon the unique circumstances of a 
given case before the probative value will outweigh its very 
real and substantial potential to prejudice.  That balance is 
better left to the trial judge who can best assess the atmosphere 
in the courtroom and the likely impact of such graphic videos.  
It is an incredibly difficult inquiry that will depend on the 
unique circumstances of a given trial.  Indeed, my colleagues 
thoughtfully explain why this case is distinguishable from 
other child pornography cases where we concluded that the 
potential for harm was simply too grave to admit certain 
graphic evidence despite its highly probative value.22  
 
 
20 United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 122 (3d Cir. 2016). 
21 Heatherly Br. at 22.  
22 See Maj. Op. 22-23 
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Because the kind of graphic evidence that was 
admissible under Rule 403 here is so highly prejudicial, it is 
important that nothing I have said be misconstrued.  I reiterate, 
there is no child pornography exception to the very difficult 
balance that Rule 403 requires.  Rather, regardless of what is 
charged or the extent to which disputed evidence tends to 
offend, each case must be evaluated on its unique facts, the 
evidence produced, and the trial atmosphere.   
 
As I have explained, the other important consideration 
here is that the defendants were charged with (and convicted 
of) conspiracy to receive or distribute child pornography in 
addition to receipt or distribution of child pornography.23  For 
the reasons I have noted, the video clips helped to establish the 
culture that permeated the Zoom chats.  That was an important 
part of proving that the participants were involved in such a 
unity of purpose and common undertaking that they had 
necessarily entered into an agreement that this type of material 
be received or distributed.  
 
Nevertheless, merely including a conspiracy charge 
does not conclusively determine the outcome of the 403 
balance nor necessarily increase the chances that the probative 
value of such evidence will outweigh its potential to inflame.  
The balance in such cases, as illustrated here, is particularly 
precarious because it is the extreme nature of the charged 
criminal conduct that yields both its probative value and its 
potential to unfairly prejudice a defendant.  This is not like the 
video of a violent shooting that we held was improperly 
admitted in violation of Rule 403 in Bailey.  A regrettable 
consequence of the violence that has become so very pervasive 
and accessible in today’s mass media is that it is well within 
the ability of lay jurors to imagine someone being violently 
gunned down by a shot to the head.  Thus, gratuitous depictions 
of such violence do not often overcome their prejudicial impact 
and they are rarely necessary to convey the essence of an event 
to jurors.  
 
What we have here is different.  The government’s 
attempt to verbalize what the defendants were watching may 
well have been inadequate to communicate the nature of the 
 
23 Appx 5, 6, 9, 10. 
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Zoom chats or whether the unity of purpose between these 
defendants was such that it suggested an implicit agreement to 
participate in these livestreams, as opposed to “merely” 
separately observing them.  Nevertheless, absent the fact that 
the jury still did not convict on all charges, I doubt that the 
centrality of the culture of the Zoom chat would have been 
sufficient to override the prejudice of subjecting jurors to these 
videos under Rule 403.   
 
Thus, I am not concerned that the government may 
begin reflexively including a conspiracy charge whenever two 
or more defendants are involved in viewing child pornography 
in an attempt to put more weight on the probative value side of 
the 403 scale.  That would risk all defendants being convicted 
of all charges.  In such a case,  it would be exceptionally 
difficult to thereafter establish that the probative value of the 
evidence outweighed its extreme potential to inflame and 
unduly prejudice jurors.  The record would contain little if 
anything to show that the jury’s capacity to reason was not 
overwhelmed or that the court did not abuse its discretion in 
letting jurors view such evidence.  Moreover, when the Rule 
403 balance is struck, the trial court has no way of knowing 
what the jury’s verdict will be.   
 
In conclusion, as is evident from all that my colleagues 
and I have said, these cases present extraordinarily difficult 
challenges to trial courts under Rule 403 because it will always 
be extremely difficult for any juror to refrain from being 
overwhelmed by emotion or animus when confronted with the 
kind of shocking evidence that these jurors were permitted to 
view.  Nevertheless, this record establishes that these jurors 
maintained their ability to reason despite whatever emotions 
they may have harbored.  I therefore agree that defendants have 
not established that the court abused its discretion in admitting 
these video clips over their Rule 403 objection.  
